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A Game of Boxed Pigs to Allow Robbing Food

Received: 5 January 2015     Accepted: 8 January 2015     Published: 27 January 2015
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Abstract

In this short paper, a new simple system of boxed pigs with three troughs, three dispensers and two panels is given. The main result is that each pig will enjoy his own labor if the pressing cost is lower; the big one will enjoy his own labor but his food has to be robbed by the small one if the pressing cost is higher but the big pig’s labor can bring profit for him; and none presses his own panel if the big pig’s labor brings loss for him. Finally, an example shows an application of the theory in technology development.

Published in Economics (Volume 4, Issue 3-1)

This article belongs to the Special Issue Axiomatic Theory of Boxed Pigs

DOI 10.11648/j.eco.s.2015040301.13
Page(s) 14-16
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2015. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Robbing Food, Boxed Pigs, Running Speed, Eating Speed, Pure Nash Equilibrium

References
[1] Rasmusen E.(1989), Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. New York: Wiley- Blackwell, 1st ed., 1994, 2nd ed., 2001, 3rd ed., 2006, 4th ed.
[2] Susan McDowell Mudambi (1996), The games retailer play, Journal of Marketing Management, 12: 695-706.
[3] Maxwell B.Stinchcombe(2002). Notes for a Course in Game Theory (Lecture), Fall Semester.
[4] John McMillan.(1992), Games, Strategies, and Manager, Oxford, New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
[5] Jiang D.Y.(2012a), Most probable situations in strong Rasmusen Axiom system for boxed pigs, Systems Engineering. 30(5), 96-100. (in Chinese)
[6] Jiang D.Y.(2012b), Possibilities of situation of boxed pigs based on peace-strong cost assumption. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences. 32 (9), 1145-1154. (in Chinese)
[7] Jiang D.Y.(2013), Axiom system for Resmusen boxed pigs and game of technology innovatios, Journal of systems Engineering. 28(2),180-186. (in Chinese)
[8] Jiang D.Y.,et.al.(2013), Enthusiasm for labor about axiomatic system on boxed pigs under background of time-consuming technology developments, Operations Reserch and Management Science, 22(5):146-152.
[9] Jiang D.Y.(2015). L-system of Boxed Pigs and its Deductive Sub-systems. Columbia(USA): Columbia International Publishing.
[10] Jiang D.Y.(2010), Situation Analysis of Double Action Games with Entropy. New York: Science Press USA Inc.
Cite This Article
  • APA Style

    Qichen Li, Dianyu Jiang, Takashi Matsuhisa, Yabin Shao, Xiaoyang Zhu. (2015). A Game of Boxed Pigs to Allow Robbing Food. Economics, 4(3-1), 14-16. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.s.2015040301.13

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    ACS Style

    Qichen Li; Dianyu Jiang; Takashi Matsuhisa; Yabin Shao; Xiaoyang Zhu. A Game of Boxed Pigs to Allow Robbing Food. Economics. 2015, 4(3-1), 14-16. doi: 10.11648/j.eco.s.2015040301.13

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    AMA Style

    Qichen Li, Dianyu Jiang, Takashi Matsuhisa, Yabin Shao, Xiaoyang Zhu. A Game of Boxed Pigs to Allow Robbing Food. Economics. 2015;4(3-1):14-16. doi: 10.11648/j.eco.s.2015040301.13

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  • @article{10.11648/j.eco.s.2015040301.13,
      author = {Qichen Li and Dianyu Jiang and Takashi Matsuhisa and Yabin Shao and Xiaoyang Zhu},
      title = {A Game of Boxed Pigs to Allow Robbing Food},
      journal = {Economics},
      volume = {4},
      number = {3-1},
      pages = {14-16},
      doi = {10.11648/j.eco.s.2015040301.13},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.s.2015040301.13},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.eco.s.2015040301.13},
      abstract = {In this short paper, a new simple system of boxed pigs with three troughs, three dispensers and two panels is given. The main result is that each pig will enjoy his own labor if the pressing cost is lower; the big one will enjoy his own labor but his food has to be robbed by the small one if the pressing cost is higher but the big pig’s labor can bring profit for him; and none presses his own panel if the big pig’s labor brings loss for him. Finally, an example shows an application of the theory in technology development.},
     year = {2015}
    }
    

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  • TY  - JOUR
    T1  - A Game of Boxed Pigs to Allow Robbing Food
    AU  - Qichen Li
    AU  - Dianyu Jiang
    AU  - Takashi Matsuhisa
    AU  - Yabin Shao
    AU  - Xiaoyang Zhu
    Y1  - 2015/01/27
    PY  - 2015
    N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.s.2015040301.13
    DO  - 10.11648/j.eco.s.2015040301.13
    T2  - Economics
    JF  - Economics
    JO  - Economics
    SP  - 14
    EP  - 16
    PB  - Science Publishing Group
    SN  - 2376-6603
    UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.eco.s.2015040301.13
    AB  - In this short paper, a new simple system of boxed pigs with three troughs, three dispensers and two panels is given. The main result is that each pig will enjoy his own labor if the pressing cost is lower; the big one will enjoy his own labor but his food has to be robbed by the small one if the pressing cost is higher but the big pig’s labor can bring profit for him; and none presses his own panel if the big pig’s labor brings loss for him. Finally, an example shows an application of the theory in technology development.
    VL  - 4
    IS  - 3-1
    ER  - 

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Author Information
  • Faculty of Mathematical and Physical Science, Huaihai Institute of Technology, Lianyungang, China

  • Institution of Game theory and its application, Huaihai Institute of Technology, Lianyungang, China

  • Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelia Research Centre, Russian Academy of Science, Karelia, Russia

  • Institution of Game theory and its application, Huaihai Institute of Technology, Lianyungang, China

  • Institution of Game theory and its application, Huaihai Institute of Technology, Lianyungang, China

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